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At the start of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy encapsulates the central tenet of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—though how this squares with the new military strikes in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson stated this, noting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This shift is consequential, but observers caution it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Disinterest and Strains

Unlike his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has developed with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Selective Intervention

A similar confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Competitors

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the current policy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.